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Abstract: 
 
This paper analyzes the influence of successive crises, including the recent European 
sovereign debt crisis, on banks’ equity returns from 11 countries. Our data span the period 
December 14
th
 2007-March 8
th
 2013 that encompasses different episodes of economic and 
financial turmoil since the collapse of the subprime credit market. Our contribution to the 
literature is twofold. First, we use an explicit multifactor model of equity returns extended 
with a sovereign risk factor. Second, we adopt a Smooth Transition Regression (STR) 
framework that allows for an endogenous definition of crisis periods and captures the 
changes in parameters associated with shift contagion. We find that contagion from the 
European sovereign debt crisis to banks’ equity returns has been confined to European 
banks, as U.S. banks’ equity returns were unharmed by its direct impact and may even have 
benefited from a kind of flight to quality effect. Besides, across banks from the euro area, 
German financial institutions have not been completely spared by the Eurozone debt crisis, 
though they have been relatively less affected.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2007-2009 crisis began by intense tensions in the financial systems of advanced 
economies and unraveled into a dramatic contraction in global growth. To prevent a 
larger collapse in economic activity, governments and central banks intervened 
massively in order to support aggregate demand – via automatic stabilizers and 
discretionary expenditures - and to bailout financial institutions. As a result, public 
finance experienced a marked degradation, leading to the emergence of the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis as a new phase of the global crisis.
1
 According to the 
IMF Fiscal Monitor, the fiscal deficit in advanced countries
2
 moves from 1.3% of 
the GDP in 2006 to 8.9% in 2009 while the public debt in percentage of the GDP 
climbed from 75.8 to 93.7 over the same period. The degradation in public finance 
has been more dramatic in the euro area, and more specifically in its peripheral 
countries. Thus, the average fiscal deficit in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain (GIIPS-group) increased from 1.6% of the GDP in 2006 to 11.2% in 2009, 
while their public debt surged from 68.4% to 89.6% (with a projected peak at 130.5 
percent of the GDP). 
 
Any drop in the market value of European sovereign debt has a negative impact on 
the balance sheets of European banks. Banks hold large amounts of government 
bonds to satisfy multiple purposes. First, investing in government bonds allows 
financial institutions to diversify their portfolio into low risk assets. The European 
prudential regulation has encouraged banks to hold such safe and liquid securities 
that may help to cushion losses on riskier assets. Second, holding government bonds 
is crucial for banks to access the central bank liquidity, insofar as the refinancing 
operations of the central bank are based on highly rated securities. Besides, 
interbank loans and repos rely heavily on the use of public bonds as collaterals. 
Therefore, when the value of sovereign bonds plummets it reduces both the market 
value of these assets in banks’ balance sheets and banks’ access to funding. These 
large holdings of Eurozone government bonds by European banks have led to a 
growing concern about possible spillovers from the sovereigns to the banks and a 
second round of spillovers from banks to sovereigns. Caruana and Avdjiev (2012) 
identify various channels of transmission from sovereign risks to the financial sector. 
First, they stress the impact of direct portfolio exposures. The Committee on the 
Global Finance System estimates that, for a sample of 21 advanced economies
3
 at 
the end-2010, the banks’ exposures to the domestic sovereign, measured as a 
percentage of banks’ equities, have been above 30 percent in all countries except 
                                                     
1
 For an overview, see Brender et al. (2013).  
2
 Advanced countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, and the United Sates. 
3
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Spain, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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Austria, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (CGFS, 2011). On average, 85 percent of 
this exposure is held in the banking book. It is important to stress that the holding of 
government bonds is characterized by a strong home bias. Second, as sovereign 
bonds are used by banks as collaterals, a decrease in the quality of government debt 
may lead to a significant deterioration of funding conditions for financial 
institutions.
4
. A third channel of transmission from sovereigns to banks resides in the 
fact that a marked increase in sovereign credit risk may trigger doubts on the ability 
of the governments to offer a credible guarantee to banks and / or financial supports 
in case of distress. In other terms a sovereign domestic debt crisis decreases the 
value of the explicit and implicit government guarantees that benefit banks that are 
considered too big or too interconnected (TBTF) to be allowed to fail. As these 
guarantees amount to very significant government subsidies (Schich and Lindh, 
2012) their impairment may have a large negative impact on TBTF banks’ balance 
sheets. 
 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the European sovereign debt 
crisis by focusing on the impact of the successive crises on banks’ equity returns 
over the period 2007-2013.  Whereas most papers of the related literature do not rely 
on an explicit theoretical model of stock returns, we start from a variant of the 
multifactor model of Fama and French, extended by Carhart (1997), to control for 
the different channels of risk transmission to banks’ stocks. More specifically, we 
modify the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) in two ways. First, we add the 
sovereign risk factor – proxied by the sovereign CDS - as an explanatory variable of 
banks’ equity returns. Second, we adopt a nonlinear specification to account for the 
nonlinearities and, more specifically the shift contagion (Forbes and Rigobon, 2001), 
that may derive from the successive crisis episodes. So far the literature on the 
consequences of the European sovereign debt crisis for the banking sector has 
mainly captured these nonlinearities through dummy variables associated to crisis 
periods or to extreme events. We use a Smooth Transition Regression (STR) model 
that allows for an endogenous definition of crisis periods, smooth transitions and 
captures the shifts in parameters associated with shift contagion.  We estimate this 
model for a sample of 11 countries, using daily data from December 14, 2007 to 
March 8, 2013.
5
  
 
Our major findings are twofold. First, our results suggest that contagion from the 
European sovereign debt crisis to banks’ equity returns has been confined to 
European banks, as U.S. banks’ equity returns did not significantly react to the crisis. 
Second, across banks from the euro area, we show that German financial institutions 
have been relatively less affected by the sovereign debt crisis. Indeed, for Germany 
nonlinearities are observed only for very high values of the transition variable that 
appear exclusively in the immediate aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ collapse. 
 
                                                     
4
 See also CGFS (2011) and van Rixtel and Gasperini (2013). 
5
 Table A1 in Appendix gives the list of countries and banks studied in this paper. 
The Impact of the Eurozone Crisis on European Banks Stocks 
Contagion or Interdependence? 
132 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a preliminary look 
at the data on the interactions between banks and sovereign risks and at the main 
related literature. Section 3 introduces the model and analyzes the main results.  
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Impact of the Sovereign European Debt Crisis: A Preliminary Look at 
the Data and the Related Literature 
 
Data 
Our data span the period 14/12/2007-08/03/2013 that encompasses four episodes of 
crises, namely: the subprime crisis of 2007/2008, followed by the global crisis after 
the failure of Lehman, Brothers, then in 2010 the Greek crisis, followed by the 
Eurozone crisis. As exhibited by Figure 1, high levels of stock market volatility – 
captured through a VSTOXX above thresholds of 30 and 40 – characterize these 
crises. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Implied volatility on European Stock Market (VSTOXX) and crisis 
episodes 
 
Source: data extracted from Macrobond 
 
Though dependent, these four episodes present some differences: the period 
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers is clearly characterized by a record 
volatility, much higher than the levels observed during the three other crisis 
episodes. The two last crises are not only characterized by a more subdued volatility, 
they are also much more local crises, mainly focused on European countries. 
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During the subprime crisis episode, Figure 2 shows that the sovereign risk indicators 
do not significantly react. Indeed, neither the term spread (Figure 2a) – a measure of 
market expectations about future conditions in the financial markets – nor the 
sovereign CDS (Figure 2b) increase in the aftermath of the collapse of the U.S. 
subprime credit market. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Sovereign Risk Indicators 
 
* 10 year Government bond yield minus 1 year LIBOR rate. 
Source: data extracted from Datastream and Macrobond. 
 
On the contrary, the banking sector experiences visible strains during this first 
episode of the global financial crisis. Indeed, not only do banks’ equity prices 
decrease (Figure 3), but risk indicators on the interbank markets exhibit signs of 
stress.  
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Figure 3: Equity Prices of the Banking Sector, 100 = 7
th
 December 2007* 
 
* Equity index have been estimated using our sample. See Appendix A1. 
Source: data extracted from Datastream. 
 
To portray the stress on the interbank market, we follow Eichengreen et al. (2012) 
and split the TED spread into two components. The first component (Figure 4a) 
refers to the banking sector credit risk premium, estimated by the difference between 
the LIBOR rates and the overnight index swap (OIS). The second (Figure 4b) is the 
liquidity risk premium measured as the OIS minus the Treasury bill rate. 
 
Figure 4a Banking Sector Credit Risk Premium Figure 4b Liquidity Premium*
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Figure 4: Stress Indicators in the Interbank Markets 
 
* For the Eurozone, we use the German Treasury bill as benchmark. 
Source: data extracted from Datastream and Macrobond. 
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The turning point in the evolution of the global financial has been the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers on the 15
th
 September 2008. Indeed, all risk indicators 
dramatically increase in the aftermath of this shock. For instance, we observe intense 
strains on the interbank markets (Figures 4a and b). In a similar way, as doubts 
increase on the health of the banking sector, banks’ CDS rise during this second 
episode of the global financial crisis (Figure 5). Interestingly, we see that banks’ 
CDS do not strongly react in the European peripheral countries, suggesting that 
market concerns have been initially focused on major advanced economies. 
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Figure 5: Banks’ CDS 
 
Source: data extracted from Datastream. 
 
More importantly for our purpose, the collapse of Lehman Brothers has changed the 
strategy adopted by authorities to face banking instability. Indeed, while official 
bailouts have been implemented on a case by case basis before this event, the 
breadth of the financial crisis following this failure has led authorities to adopt 
systematic bailout programs. As a result, public finance experiences a significant 
degradation leading to increased interactions between banks’ and sovereigns’ risks. 
Acharya et al. (2013) find that in the pre-bailout period – that is before the 
announcement of the bailout in Ireland in late September 2008 - no clear relationship 
between banks’ and sovereigns’ CDS is identified. The situation changes in the 
aftermath of the bailouts. In a similar way, Mody and Sandri (2012) consider that the 
nationalization of Anglo-Irish in January 2009 has played a decisive role in the 
increase in the sensitivity of the sovereign’s spread to the weakness of the financial 
sector.
6
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The Greek sovereign debt crisis that unraveled in 2010 marks a new phase in the 
development of the global financial crisis. Indeed, the onset of this crisis has 
increased the implied volatility on the European stock market after a period of 
relative tranquility (Figure 1). Above all, the spreading of the crisis to many 
European countries - the so-called GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain) - has boosted up risk indicators concerning both banks and sovereigns. Three 
points are especially important for our purpose. First, even if banks from the GIIPS 
have been particularly affected by the crisis, banks from other countries - and 
especially from the Eurozone - were also impacted. For instance, Figure 3 exhibits a 
decrease in banks’ equity prices in all Eurozone countries suggesting the presence of 
contagion effects inside the monetary union. Second, periods of stress and tranquility 
have alternated since the beginning of the Eurozone crisis, following the progress 
accomplished by European institutions, including the European central bank, to 
solve the sovereign debt crisis (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Main measures taken to solve the Eurozone crisis 
 
March 2010 The European Union offers support to Greece 
May 2010 
The European Union launches the European Financial Stability 
Facility 
May 2010 The European Central Bank starts Securities Market Program 
July 2010 Stress tests results 
July 2011 The European Union offers a second support to Greece 
December 2011 
The European Central Bank launches the 1
st
  Long-Term 
Refinancing Operations 
February 2012 
The European Central Bank launches the 2
nd
 Long-Term 
Refinancing Operations 
February 2012 
The European Commission launches the Alert Mechanism 
Report 
August 2012 
The European Central Bank launches the Outright Monetary 
Transactions program 
October 2012 The European banking union project 
 
Third, the behavior of U.S. and U.K. risk indicators suggests that the spillovers from 
the eurozone crisis to these countries have been limited. During the debt crisis the 
U.S. and U.K. sovereign CDS increased much less than the sovereign CDS of the 
Eurozone (Figure 2b). The difference is even more striking if we consider equity 
prices (Figure 3). Indeed, while the U.S. and U.K. equity prices of the banking sector 
experienced a recovery after the trough in March 2009, equity prices in the Eurozone 
increased only slightly in the core economies of the Eurozone and remained 
depressed in the GIIPS. Lastly, if Figure 4a suggests that there might be some 
negative spillovers from the Eurozone crisis to the U.S. and U.K. interbank markets 
their impact appears to be relatively weak. These conjectures are further 
J.P. Allegret, H. Raymond and H. Rharrabti 
 
137 
 
strengthened by the observation that the U.S. and U.K. liquidity premiums (Figure 
4b) do not react to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis developments. 
 
Literature 
Our study is closely related to two strands of the existing literature. The first one 
investigates the determinants of equity returns and credit risks in the banking sector. 
The second strand analyzes the extent of contagion from the sovereign debt crisis to 
banks. 
 
Alter and Schuler (2012) contribute to the first strand of the literature. They examine 
whether the sovereign default risk exerts an influence on the default risk of the 
banking sector in the Eurozone. To this end, they consider daily credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads from 7 Eurozone member states and 21 banks over the period June 
2007-May 2010. Their main aim is to determine to what extent these CDS spreads’ 
interdependencies differ before (June 2007-mid-September 2008) and after (late-
October 2008-May 2010) the implementation of bank bailout programs by European 
governments and institutions. They find that, while before the bailouts the sovereign 
CDS spreads affect only marginally the bank CDS spreads from the same country, 
their influence tends to become permanent in the period following the 
implementation of the bailout programs. Gross and Koky (2013) show – over a 
sample  comprising 23 sovereigns and 41 banks from Europe, the United States, and 
Japan from January 2008 to April 2013 - that sovereign-to-bank spillovers have been 
particularly intense in 2011-2012 when the euro area sovereign debt crisis was at its 
peak. Arnold (2012) examines spillover of sovereign risk to the banking sector by 
introducing interactions effects that measure the level of exposure to GIPS - based 
on July 2010 stress tests - and whether the bank originates from GIPS (Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain). Arnold (2012) estimates co-variations between 
combined GIPS Sovereign CDS spreads and banking risks during time windows 
centered on the weekend of May 8-9, 2010.
7
 Banking risks are measured with banks’ 
stock returns and CDS rates.
8
 Two results are especially interesting. First, an 
increase in the combined Sovereign CDS rates in GIPS exerts a negative influence 
on the banking sector risk (i.e. banks’ CDS spread increase and banks’ stock returns 
fall). Second, banks heavily exposed to GIPS seem stronger impacted by the 
increase in sovereign CDS spread, but this result is mainly driven by banks 
originated from the GIPS. 
 
Poirson and Schmittman (2013) estimate a variant of the world Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) with a country-specific factor. Their sample includes daily stock 
returns from December 2002 to November 2011 for 83 banks from 21 countries. 
                                                     
7
 Two time windows are considered: one month and two months. On 8-9 May, 2010, 
European Union members agreed to implement a rescue funds for governments experiencing 
refinancing problems in bond markets. 
8
 The sample includes 51 banks drawn from the 91 banks that participated in the July 2010 
stress tests for which CDS rates and stock prices are available.  
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Results suggest that the sensitivity of banks to global factors (beta of the global 
factor) increases in times of strong market volatility: in 2008-2009 in the aftermath 
of Lehman Brothers collapse and in 2011 with the European debt crisis. 
Interestingly, Poirson and Schmittman (2013) confirm the findings by Chan-Lau et 
al. (2012) concerning the regional dimension of the European debt crisis: the 
European debt crisis affects more European banks (including the United Kingdom) 
than banks located in other regions. In addition, Chan-Lau et al. (2012) stress that 
bank-specific characteristics matter, as higher capitalization, lower leverage, and less 
reliance on wholesale funding improve the resilience of banks (equity returns). 
 
The second strand of the relevant literature investigates more directly contagion 
effects from sovereign debt crises to the banking sector. 
 
De Bruyckere et al. (2013) define contagion as “excess correlation”, that is to say a 
correlation over and above that resulting from economic fundamentals.  Their study 
covers 15 countries and 40 banks over the period 2007-2012. De Bruyckere et al. 
(2013) get three major findings. First, they identify significant evidence of contagion 
between banks and sovereigns CDS spreads during the European debt crisis. Second, 
as banks’ government exposures exhibit home bias, they show that contagion effects 
are stronger between banks and their home country. Third, as previous studies, the 
intensity of contagion is influenced by bank-specific characteristics. For instance, 
bank capital adequacy and the extent of reliance on short-term sources influence the 
degree of contagion. Alter and Beyer (2014) quantify the sovereign-banks feedback 
loop using daily sovereign and bank CDS spreads from 11 Eurozone countries and 
34 banks over the period October 2009-July 2012. An interesting contribution of this 
paper is the elaboration of a “Contagion Index” decomposed into four components: 
(i) amongst sovereigns, (ii) amongst banks; (iii) from sovereigns to banks, and (iv) 
from banks to sovereigns. The paper finds an upward trend concerning both the 
contagion index of sovereigns and the overall contagion index. In periods of stress, 
the feedback loop intensifies. Finally, shocks on Spanish sovereign CDS spread 
suggest that “non-core” countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal) are more 
sensitive than “core” countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and 
the Netherlands), but the difference between these groups decreases during times of 
distress. 
 
Contrary to the two above mentioned papers Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012) 
base their study of the contagion from sovereigns to the banking sector on banks’ 
equity returns. More specifically they examine the sensitivity of daily stock returns 
of financial firms and non-financial corporations in 11 Eurozone members to the 
U.S. stock returns, the euro-dollar exchange rate and the gap between Greek and 
German CDS spreads. In order to detect contagion they use dummy variables to test 
whether there is a shift in some of the coefficients during crises.
9
 On the one hand, 
                                                     
9
 To determine the starting point of the financial crisis, Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012) 
follow the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ crisis timeline. 
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the authors find the presence of shift contagion as the transmission of shocks is 
stronger during the 2007-2010 crisis. On the other hand, after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers stock returns of financial firms have been more sensitive to 
changes in the Greek-German sovereign CDS spread. This suggests a contagion 
from sovereigns to banks. In a similar vein, Bhanot et al. (2014) investigate the 
impact of changes in Greek bond yield spreads on the daily abnormal financial 
sector returns in euro area crisis countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) and in 
euro area non-crisis countries (Austria, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands) from 
January 2005 to June 2011. They assess whether changes in the Sovereign Greek 
bond yield exhibit stronger impact in crisis periods or in the aftermath of news 
announcements. Like Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012) they rely on a crisis 
dummy. Bhanot et al. (2014) also explore for evidence of news spillovers. To this 
end, they collect news announcements for Greece and the rest of the euro area and 
construct good and bad news dummies. Bhanot et al. (2014) find evidence of 
spillovers from the Greek bond yield to Eurozone financial stock returns on days 
when there are ratings downgrades, suggesting the presence of information effects. 
In addition, they show that non-crisis countries are affected by ratings downgrades 
and bad news concerning Greece from the European Commission and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
Overall the results of the related literature point at some nonlinear transmission of 
shocks to banks during the period 2007-2011 and, more specifically, at some 
spillovers from the GIPS Sovereign debt crisis to the banking sector. We contribute 
to this literature in two ways. First, by using a multifactor model of banks’ stock 
returns to control more comprehensively for the different channels of risk 
transmission to banks’ stocks. Second, through a nonlinear modelling, allowing for 
an endogeneous definition of crisis periods and for a smooth transition between 
regimes. The model and the methodology used are presented in detail in the next 
section. 
 
3. Methodology and Results 
 
The Model 
To assess whether and how the stock returns of European and U.S. banks have been 
impacted by the sovereign European debt crisis and by the previous episodes of 
financial turmoil experienced since 2007 we start from the four-factor model of 
Carhart (1997): 
 
          (1) 
Where tpR ,  is the excess return of banks stocks over the risk free interest rate, tMR ,  
is the excess global stock market return over the risk free interest rate, tSMBR ,  is the 
spread between the returns on small and big stocks, tHMLR ,  is the spread between the 
tptMOMMOMtHMLHMLtSMBSMBtMMtp RRRRR ,,,,,,  
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returns of high book-to-market stocks (value stocks) and low ones (growth stocks), 
tMOMR ,  is the spread between the returns of past winners (stocks with the highest 
prior returns) and past losers (stocks with the lowest prior returns). 
Equation (1) nests the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) as the special 
case where the momentum factor drops out (βMOM=0). Fama and French (1996) 
advocate that their three-factor model is the best benchmark model, as it accounts for 
most of the market anomalies left unexplained by the one factor Sharpe (1964) - 
Lintner (1965) CAPM. Indeed, following Fama and French (1993) the empirical 
success of their model allows its interpretation as an equilibrium multifactor model 
of stock returns, consistent with the arbitrage pricing theory of Ross (1976). In this 
framework, tMR , , tSMBR ,  and tHMLR ,  can be interpreted as three common sources of 
risk across stocks, namely the market risk of the CAPM ( tMR , ) and two other non-
diversifiable risks: a small size risk, captured by tSMBR , , and a distress risk, captured 
by tHMLR , . However Fama and French (1996) acknowledge that their three-factor 
model does not account for the short run persistence of returns or momentum effect 
put into evidence by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Therefore, following Carhart 
(1997) we use the more general four-factor model. 
 
The sovereign European debt crisis of 2010-2011 has undermined the recovery of 
European banks from the financial and banking crisis of 2007-2008: the 
downgrading of sovereign ratings have fuelled the downgrading of banks, the 
sovereign debt holdings of banks have depreciated as has the implicit sovereign 
guarantee to banks. The consequences of sovereign risks for the private sector of 
advanced countries have long been deemed negligible and, as such, have been 
neglected by the mainstream financial literature on stocks common risk factors. To 
allow for the specific additional risk entailed by the European sovereign debt crisis 
we add to equation (1) a European sovereign risk factor tSOVR , , proxied by the 
change in the sovereign CDS: 
          (2) 
In order to introduce nonlinearities in the model and test for shift contagion (Forbes 
and Rigobon, 2001), we turn to a STR extension of equation (2) in which the 
coefficients may change during crisis episodes:  
          (3) 
 
Where the transition function  cvg t ,;  varies between 0 and 1 as the transition 
variable tv  crosses the threshold c.  
 
tptSOVSOVtMOMMOMtHMLHMLtSMBSMBtMMtp RRRRRR ,,,,,,,  
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,,,,,,
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 


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As we look for a transition variable tv that may represent the financial cycle (Rey, 
2013) and crisis episodes in the Eurozone we opt for the VSTOXX, the implied 
volatility of the Eurostoxx50, a Eurozone stock market index. In the high volatility 
regime, when the VSTOXX is above its threshold value c, we expect that some 
shifts may affect the coefficients and that they will be captured through the estimated 
coefficients in the second (nonlinear) part of equation (3). 
 
We study the daily returns on banks stocks from ten European countries –Belgium 
(BE), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), France (FR), the UK (GB), Greece (GR), Ireland 
(IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NE), Portugal (PT)- and for purposes of 
comparison, we extend our analysis to U.S. banks. We consider banks for which 
both quotation and CDS are available, as their stocks are the most liquid ones and to 
facilitate comparisons with the related literature. The definition of the data and their 
sources are detailed in Appendix A2.  
 
As is apparent from Figure 2b, the countries that experienced the highest increases 
of their Sovereign CDS indices during the European crisis are Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal (GIP). We therefore calculate an average sovereign CDS index for the GIP 
countries, using as weights the relative percentages of their governments 
consolidated gross debts extracted from Eurostat over 2007-2012. We then calculate 
tSOVR , , our proxy of the sovereign debt risk in the Eurozone simply as the first 
difference of the logged GIP CDS index. 
 
Results 
We focus our comments on the presence of nonlinearities in our model and on the 
impact of GIP sovereign risks on banks. 
 
Nonlinearities in the final estimations 
The nonlinear LSTR1 model with the VSTOXX (t- ) as a transition variable is 
supported by the results of the smooth transition regressions (Table 2). With the 
notable exception of Greek banks returns, whose constant becomes –
 unsurprisingly - negative in periods of high volatility (
NL = -1.13), the constant is 
not significant in any regime. But all countries experience significant change in the 
factors coefficients when the European Stock market volatility increases: some shift 
contagion seems to have been at work during the last crises. The smoothest 
transitions (low slope parameter ) are observed for French banks, while German 
banks’ returns experience the roughest transitions. However, according to the 
threshold estimate found for Germany (second column and last line of Table 2) the 
rough transition towards the high volatility regime only affects Germany when the 
VSTOXX hits record highs equal or above a threshold c of 60. As is apparent from 
Figure 1 it only happens for a short time in October and November 2008, in the 
aftermath of Lehman's bankruptcy filing. 
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Table 2: The linear and nonlinear impact of the European sovereign debt crisis: Results of the nonlinear estimations of the 
multifactor model of bank returns 
 
 BE DE ES FR GB GR IE IT NE PT U.S. 
Linear Parameters 
L  0.09 -0.07* -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.22 -0.10 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 
L
SOV
  -0.12*** -0.04*** 
-
0.11*** 
-0.06 -0.04* -0.28*** -0.04 -0.03 -0.05** -0.08*** 0.02* 
Nonlinear Parameters 
NL  -0.27 0.22 0.13 0.28 1.16 -1.14** 0.12 0.26 -0.12 -0.19 -0.20 
NL
SOV
  -0.70*** -0.09 0.05* -0.36* -0.27 0.17* -0.47** -0.21** -0.36) -0.08 0.02 
Transition Parameters 
 2.51 472 15.6 0.91 1.15 3.35 1.85 1.19 1.53 2.69 5.77 
c 48.9 59.6 30.9 56.9 63.1 41.6 51.8 43.4 55.8 41.5 40.6 
 
Note: * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% 
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The linear and nonlinear impact of GIP Sovereign CDSs 
The results displayed in Table 2 show that in all the European countries under study 
banks’ returns have at some point been negatively impacted by the rise in the 
Sovereign CDS of Greece, Ireland and Portugal (GIP). Indeed, either 
L
SOV  and/or 
NL
SOV  are negative and their sum is always below zero: when the VSTOXX surges 
above a threshold (c) estimated between 30 (for Spain) and 63 (for the UK) 
European banks stock returns drop in response to a rise in the Sovereign risk of the 
three countries most adversely hit by the European sovereign debt crisis. This 
finding is consistent with the results of Chan-Lau et al. (2012) and Grammatikos and 
Vermeulen (2012) concerning the transmission of Sovereign risks to banks during 
the period 2008-2011. For Germany this negative impact is slight (
L
SOV =-0.04 and 
NL
SOV =0 cannot be rejected), but nonetheless significant. For some countries, such as 
Greece or Spain, the negative impact is more sizable ( L
SOV  being larger) - which 
may explain why Arnold (2012) mainly captures this effect - though it does not 
appear to be further strengthened when the VSTOXX increases sharply. But for most 
European countries the nonlinear effect is dramatic: it is mostly when the VSTOXX 
rises above its threshold c that the high risk aversion and the European economic 
downturn cause banks stock returns to plummet in reaction to a hike in GIP 
sovereign CDSs. Not surprisingly the Irish banks are amongst the most severely 
affected, a result again in line with Arnold (2012). But, in line with the conclusions 
of Bhanot et al. (2014) and Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012), we find that some 
contagion appears to spread the negative impact of the GIP Sovereign risks outside 
the GIP and, in particular, it harshly hits the Belgian, Italian and French banks for 
which the estimates of 
NL
SOV  are largely negative. These results contrast interestingly 
with the one found for U.S. banks, which seem to stay mostly unharmed by the 
direct impact of the European Sovereign debt crisis: at a 10% significance level U.S. 
banks returns appear even to slightly benefit (
L
SOV >0) from the European turmoil 
through a kind of flight to quality effect. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This study provides some empirical evidence on contagion between banks and 
European sovereigns during the successive episodes of crises of the period 2007-
2013, including the recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. More specifically, we use 
an explicit multifactor model of banks’ equity returns in a nonlinear context to assess 
to what extent and through which risk factors the European sovereign debt crisis has 
exerted an influence on banks’ equity returns. The use of a variant of the Carhart-
Fama-French model allows us to control for the multiple common risk factors other 
than sovereign risk that may have impacted banks’ stock returns over the period. 
Besides, we capture changes in parameters associated with shift contagion by 
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estimating a Smooth Transition Regression model. The main advantages of this 
approach are to allow for an endogenous definition of crisis periods and for smooth 
transitions between regimes. Our findings suggest that contagion effects have been 
limited to European banks and that the delay in cleaning up European banks’ balance 
sheets of their distressed assets has put them at a disadvantage relatively to their 
American counterparts. In addition, if we focus more particularly on the impact of 
GIP (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) sovereign CDS, we show that contagion effects 
appear beyond the banks located in these countries, as banks’ equity returns from 
Belgium, France and Italy have been negatively impacted by the sovereign debt 
crisis. This result contrast with the one found for U.S. banks, which seem to be 
unharmed by the direct impact of the European Sovereign debt crisis and even to 
slightly benefit from the European turmoil through a kind of flight to quality effect. 
In terms of policy implications, our results clearly suggest that a resolution of the 
sovereign debt crisis is a prerequisite to strengthen the stability of the European 
banking system. From this standpoint, there is a complementarity between the 
European banking union project and the implementation of mechanisms allowing the 
resolution of the sovereign debt crisis at the European level. More particularly, our 
findings echo the studies stressing the structural changes about the public debt 
management implied by the creation of the monetary union.
10
  
 
                                                     
10
 See, for instance, Pisani-Ferry (2012), De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and Krugman (2013). 
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Appendix 
Table A1: List of countries and banks 
Belgium KBC Bank 
France BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole S.A., Natixis, and Société Générale 
Germany Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, IKB Deutsche Industriebank, 
Landesbank Berlin Holding, and Landesbank Hessen-Thuringen Giro 
Genussscheine 
Greece Alpha Bank, Eurobank Ergasias S.A., and National Bank of Greece 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland, and Permanent TSB Group 
Holdings 
Italy Banca Monte Dei Paschi, Intesa Sanpaolo, Mediobanca, and 
Unicredit 
Netherlands Aegon and ING 
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues and Banco Espirito Santo 
Spain Banco De Sabadell, Banco Popular Espanol, Banco Santander, Banco 
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, and Banco Intercontinental Espanol 
United Kingdom Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, and Standard Chartered 
United States American Express, Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, 
Capital One Financial, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, 
and PNC Financial Services 
 
Table A2: Data and Sources 
 
VSTO
XX 
Implied volatility 
of the 
Eurostoxx50 
Macrobond 
tpR ,  
Banks’ stock 
excess returns 
Average of the total daily stock returns of the banks of the country 
minus the 3 months government interest rate 
The stock returns are extracted from Datastream. 
The 3 months government interest rates are the 3 months yields of 
government benchmarks from Macrobond 
tMR ,  
Global market 
factor 
Difference between the daily total return of the MSCI, IMI Equity 
Index and the 3 months US government yield benchmark. Source: 
Macrobond 
tSMBR ,
 
Size  http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Libra
ry/f-f_factors.html 
tHMLR ,
 
Book-to-market http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Libra
ry/f-f_factors.html 
tMOMR ,
 
Momentum factor http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Libra
ry/det_mom_factor_daily.html. 
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tSOVR ,
 
Sovereign debt 
crisis 
Average sovereign CDS index for the GIP countries, using as 
weights the relative percentages of their governments consolidated 
gross debts extracted from Eurostat over 2007-2012 
5 years Eurozone Sovereign senior CDS indices extracted from 
Datastream 
 
 
 
 
 
